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COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND:
THEIR DESIRABILITY AND UTILITY
Introduction
Uncertainty in the law of real covenants has long plagued
courts in the United States. The problem generally has centered
around the tests or criteria which determine whether or not a
convenant is one that may "run with the land," i.e., a covenant
that will bind subsequent purchasers and sellers although they
are not a party to the original agreement. This uncertainty,
mainly caused by the common law axiom that such covenants
are encumbrances on the title to land and thus should be
strictly construed in order not to impede the free alienability
of land, has done much to retard the use of these covenants.
This is true even in the face of the possibility, and often times
without considering that possibility to any extent, that these
covenants could be of some value to the landowners concerned.
This is unfortunate; it seems that a positive attitude by the
courts toward these covenants could perform a valuable service
to those homeowners who have made and are relying on such
covenants.
In order to promote a more adequate consideration of these
covenants by courts and lawyers, the theory of this Note will be
to emphasize that dimension of the problem which paradoxically
enough is most often overlooked: the utility of running covenants.
For this reason, at the conclusion, the article will resolve itself
into a consideration of what would seem to be the basic question
involved: are these covenants valuable enough to landowners
and to society to outweigh any objection which might be made
concerning their use. Possibly a uniform answer to this question,
one on which a majority of the members of the legal profession
could agree, would do more toward paving the way for a clarifica-
tion of the law of running covenants than anything else.
Today as a result of the continual race to the suburbs through-
out the country, extensive new residential areas have been de-
veloped. Many of the new homeowners in these areas, desirous of
protecting their investment, have made agreements with their
seller and/or with their neighbors regarding their property.
These people want to know if their agreements will still protect
them should one of their neighbors decide to sell to some one
(Vol. XXXHI
NOTES
else; or if they themselves should desire to sell, will the pros-
pective purchaser also be protected by these agreements merely
because he has purchased the land. The theory of the running
covenant is as simple as that. Yet, in many cases, courts persist
in *keeping the real value of the covenant shrouded in considera-
tions of whether or not it meets standards set hundreds
of years ago. Consideration is not given to the possibility that
these tests may be outmoded and do not meet the needs of mod-
ern society and the modern landowner.
The scope of this Note will include a brief discussion of the
law of covenants running with a fee as it stands today. Then it
will proceed to an objective evaluation of certain types of
covenants. Naturally, every conceivable covenant which could
run with the land will not be discussed. Rather, -analysis will be
limited to those covenants which are used most often by home-
owners, and which lend themselves more readily to use in this
period of new home construction.
Tests Applicable to Running Covenants
Almost all states require that a real covenant satisfy four
tests before it will run with the land. These tests are: (1) the
form of the instrument creating the covenant, (2) the intention
of the parties, (3) whether or not the covenant "touches or con-
cerns" the property concerned, (4) privity of estate.' Most
courts will agree that these are the requirements which must
be met before the covenant can be enforced, but conflict arises
in "the application of these four requisites.
When considering the form requirement, most courts demand
that the covenant be in writing. Some states require a written
instrument because they believe such covenants to be an interest
in land.2 Other courts do so for pure policy reasons, favoring
certainty in realty titles by disallowing restrictions based solely
"on oral testimony, which by nature is oft-times indefinite and
inherently unstable."3 To complete the confusion, still other
courts do not require that these covenants be in writing, holding
that running covenants are not interests in land.4 Also to be
1 Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank,
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938); McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d
607 (1943); 2 ADMERicAN LAw oF PROPRT §§ 9.9, 9.11, 9.13, 9.22 (Casner ed.
1952); CLARX, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS WnicH RuN WrH LAND 94 (2d ed.
1947); 3 TnrANY, REAL PnoPEaRY §§ 848, 851, 854 (3d ed. 1939).
2 Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925).
3 Warren v. Protano Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 686, 693 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
4 McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 319, 90 Atl. 73 (1914). The American Law
of Property agrees that these covenants are not interests in land. It states
Continued on page 504
1957i]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
considered under the form requirement is the necessity of a
seal. Since the necessity for the use of a seal in formal transacw
tions has been largely abolished today by statute, the seal gen'
erally is not required on a running covenant.5 This is not a
unanimous holding, for seals are still required on running cov-
enants in those jurisdictions which have not abolished the use
of the seal.6 Mention should be made, too, of those covenants
which may be contained in a deed poll. The general rule is that
a deed poll will satisfy the form requirementZ
For the most part, there is general agreement in the applica-
tion of the intent requirement.S It is well settled that the words
"heirs and assigns" are not essential to show an intent that the
covenant should run with the land; rather, courts will find that
intent from the surrounding circumstances.9 There is some dis-
crepancy, however, as to the application of the terrn "surround-
ing circumstances," since in some states the courts will look at
all of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the covenant, 10
while in other states only the instrument itself is considered to
show that the requisite intention was present when the covenant
was signed.:"
that they are contracts only. 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.8 (Casner ed.
1952). Sims points out that England and fourteen states seem to, also,
agree that the covenants are not interests in land, while nine states still
hold that they are. He concludes by saying that actually it makes little
difference whether or not they are considered interests in land, since
"probably more than ninety per cent of covenants intended to be
attached to land are in writing." Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Ex-
ceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Institute,
30 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 28 (1944).
5 Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 54 S.E. 701 (1906);
2 AMERciAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.9 (Casner ed. 1952).
6 Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Baltimore-Gillet Co., 176 Md.
594, 6 A.2d 226 (1939).
7 Sanitary Dist. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 Ill. 529, 116 N.E. 161
(1917); Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 532 (1944). The Restatement also requires that the covenant
be in writing and under seal where seals are required, on the rationale
that these covenants are interests in land. It agrees that where the effective-
ness of the seal has been abolished by statute, a seal is not necessary.
8 2 AMEmicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.10 (Casner ed. 1952). Mr. Tiffany
also points out what seems to be the universal holding of the courts that
even though a covenant may satisfy all of the other tests necessary, the
parties may prevent its running with the land if they show an intention that
it not run. Id. § 854.
9 Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r, 265 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. App. 1954); Maher v.
Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N.E.2d 955 (1936);
Aull v. Kraft, 286 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
10 Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., supra note 9.
11 Aull v. Kraft, 286 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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Probably the most difficult of the four tests to define is touch
and concern: " . . . It has been found impossible to state any
absolute tests to determine what covenants touch and concern
the land and what do not."'12 Even faced with this difficulty, and
in many cases recognizing it, the courts almost unanimously hold
that such a test must be met.:' The test most often used to dis-
cover whether or not a certain covenant runs with the land is that
set forth by the late Dean Bigelow:
The determining characteristic of the covenants now being
considered is that they operate either to make more valuable some
of the rights, privileges, or powers possessed by the covenantee
or relieve him in whole or in part of some of his duties.14
In following this test, courts have usually required that the cov-
enant affect the nature, use, enjoyment, and value of the land,15
or that it be "so related to the land as to enhance its value and
confer a benefit upon it."'36
Though courts do agree for the most part as to the require-
ments which satisfy the touch and concern factor, there has
been wide disagreement as to the type of covenants which meet
those requirements. Professor Sims vividly pointed out this fact,' 7
and he gave the following as an example. An English court
considered a covenant to ship coal from a particular mine over
an auxiliary railroad not to touch and concern the mine from
which the coal was taken,' 8 while a Pennsylvania court found
12 CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNNG WITH LAND 96 (2d ed.
1947).
'3 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, Ashburn, Sylvester & Camilla
Ry. Co., 91 Ga. App. 698, 87 S.E.2d 92 (1955); Tucker v. Carter Oil Co., 315
Ill. App. 264, 43 N.E.2d 99 (1942); Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,
281 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1955); Craven County v. First-Citizens Bank
& Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953); Caplan v. Pittsburgh, 375 Pa.
268. 100 A.2d 380 (1953); 2 AmRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.13 (Casner ed.
1952).
:L4 Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MicH. L. Rv. 639, 645
(1914). It should be noted that although Bigelow was writing about
running covenants in leases, nevertheless, the test he set forth in the
article is applicable to running covenants in other types of estates. The
original statement of the requirement that a running covenant must
touch and concern land was put forth in a case which involved a running
covenant in a lease. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.
1583); CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNiNG WIH LAND 96 (2d ed. 1947).
15 Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 181 S.E. 66 (1935).
16 Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 295 P.2d 714, 720 (Wash.
1956). See also Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S.E. 701
(1906).
17 See Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement
of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 34 (1944).
18 Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1834).
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that a similar covenant did touch and concern the mine in-
volved.'9 . Covenants not to compete have been treated similarly
by the different jurisdictions.20 Also, one state, New York, has
been a lone advocate of the proposition that only negative or
restrictive covenants touch or concern the land; therefore, in
New York, only negative covenants, as a rule, will be allowed
to run with the land.21 However, all other jurisdictions seem to
agree that under certain circumstances, affirmative covenants
as well as negative covenants will run with the land.-2 Even
though the law as to which covenants do touch and concern
the land is definitely not settled at the present, it does not seem
that this requirement can be eliminated.23 The Restatement of
Property advocates a strict interpretation of the touch and con-
cern requirement. It requires that a promise be for the benefit
of either the promisor or the promisee in the physical use and
enjoyment of the land, and that the burden on the land of the
promisor bear a reasonable relation to the benefit received by
the person benefited, in order that a covenant fulfill the touch
and concern requirement.
24
The privity of estate requirement is the concept which has
caused the real furor in the law of real covenants. Granting
discrepancies in interpretation of the form and the touch and
concern requirements, neither of these has provoked as much
interest in the law of running covenants as has the requirement
of privity of estate. As was the problem with the other tests,
it is agreed that there must be such a requirement; 25 once again
the difference is in the interpretation of the term. Conflict of
opinion on the subject arose between Judge Charles E. Clark of
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
Professor Oliver S. Rundell, the reporter for the section of the
19 Bald Eagle Val. R.R. v. Nittany Val. R.R., 171 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 239
(1895).
20 Sjblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 114 N.W. 746 (1908). Contra, National
Union Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173 (1877).
21 Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Queens County Ry., 253 N.Y. 190,
170 N.E. 887 (1930), appeal dismissed, 282 U.S. 803 (1930); TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 854 (3d ed. 1939).
22 Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925); Norby v. Section Line
Drainage Dist., 159 Or. 80, 76 P.2d 966 (1938). See also Annot., 102 A.L.R. 781
(1936).
23 See Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement
of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 34 (1944).
24 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 537 (1944).
25 Wood Fabricators, Inc. v. Hayes, 250 Ala. 475, 35 So. 2d 106 (1948);
Hazlet v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881); Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil
Co., 281 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1955).
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Restatement of Property concerning servitudes, in a series of
law review discussions. 26 At this same time, Mr. Sims also was
writing on the subject of running covenants.27 The gist of the
articles by Clark and Sims, in regard to the privity of estate
concept, was that the Restatement of Property was inaccurate
in its privity of estate requirements. The Restatement sets out
two alternative means of fulfilling the requirement: (1) by an
adjustment of mutual relationships arising out of an easement, or
(2) by there being a grant of land with which the covenant
is to run at the time of the making of the covenant.2s Sims stated
in his article that seven states seemed not to require a grant in
fulfillment of the privity of estate concept, citing one principal
case in each of the enumerated states.29 Of the cases cited by
Sims, two involved party wall agreements,30 another seemed to
involve a covenant running with a leasehold interest and not a
fee,3 1 and another involved a mortgage in which the grantee
was not held liable for the mortgage payments since he took the
property subject to the mortgage but did not expressly agree
to make the payments.3 2 Moreover, a Michigan case cited by him
involved a covenant written into a land contract, though the
statement that a grant was necessary was not made in the case.s3
The privity requirement of California, listed as one of the seven
states, is governed by statutei"
After Sims' article was published, Clark wrote another article
in which he praised the discussion by Sims, referring to it as be-
ing "in the grand tradition of legal scholarship."s5 Clark agreed
26 Judge Clark criticized §§ 534 and 537 of the RESTATEDaENT in Clark, The
American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YArs L.J. 699 (1943).
Professor Rundell answered him, Rundell, Judge Clark on the American
Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, 53 YAz L.J. 312
(1944). Judge Clark then responded to Professor Rundell's comment,
Clark, A Note on Professor Rundel~s Comment, 53 YAE L.J. 327 (1944).
27 Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of
the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CoRumu L.Q. 1 (1944).
28 RESTAT NT, PaoPRPv § 534 (1944).
29 Sims, supra note 27 at 31.
30 Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 82 Pac. 785 (1905); Loyal Mystic
Legion v. Jones, 73 Neb. 342, 102 N.W. 621 (1905).
31 Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1935).
32 Pelser v. Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 8 N.W.2d 36 (1943).
33 Mueller v. Banker's Trust Co., 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1932).
34 The effect of the California statutes seems to be that a benefit in a
grant may run; a covenant burdening land may not run if it is in a grant,
but it may run if it is made between adjoining landowners. CAL. CIv.
CoDE ANN. §§ 1462, 1468 (West 1954).
35 Clark, More About the "Law" of Real Covenants and Its Restatement,
30 ComNsz. L.Q. 378 (1945).
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with Sims on the states listed by the latter as holding that
no grant was needed between covenantor and covenantee to ful-
fill the privity of estate requirement, but said that he would add
more states to the listing. Clark then listed twelve other states,
some of which Sims had previously said required the grant.3 6
Of the twelve, four states had cases expressly stating that a
grant of land was needed between the convenanting parties.3 7
In another, no grant was required, but the case involved a run-
ning benefit.38
Four of the states he named apparently were in agreement
with him;39 it seems that they are the only states among the nine-
teen referred to by Clark which did support his position, and one
of the four was controlled by statute.40 A late Missouri case has
also followed the views of Clark and Sims, requiring only a
grant between the convenantor and his successor to constitute
privity of estate. 1 Thus, a majority of the states now require
a grant of -an interest in land between the convenanting parties
to meet the requirement of privity of estate. The better rule,
however, would seem to be the one advocated by Clark and
Sims, even though at present the states which follow it are in a
small minority.
Extra-Legal Considerations
An attempt will now be made to determine what value these
covenants can be to society and to the landowners concerned.
As has been mentioned earlier, not all the conceivable covenants
will be considered. By necessity, a limited few have been
36 Clark listed Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wash-
ington, id. at 384, n. 23. In the same footnote, he also mentions Colorado,
Iowa, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wis-
consin as states in which he found "nothing really inconsistent to prevent
the adoption of such a rule .... " Ibid.
37 Blaum v. May, 245 Ala. 156, 16 So. 2d 329 (1944); Hazlett v. Sinclair,
76 Ind. 488 (1881); Barringer v. Virginia Trust Co., 132 N.C. 409, 43 S.E.
910 (1903); Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
38 Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N.W. 874 (1883).
39 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Sanders, 91 Ark. 153, 121 S.W. 337 (1909);
Reidsville & S.E.R. Co. v. Baxter, 13 Ga. App. 357, 79 S.E. 187 (1913);
Bolles v. Pecos Irr. Co., 23 N.M. 32, 167 Pac. 280 (1917); Adamson v. Black
Rock Power & Irr. Co., 297 Fed. 905 (9th Cir. 1924).
40 GA. CoD ANI'. § 29-301 (1952). "The purchaser of lands obtains with
the title however conveyed . . ., all the rights which any former owner
of the land, under whom he claims, may have had ......
41 Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1955).
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chosen: (1) covenants that property is to be used only for
residential purposes; (2) covenants that a property owner an-
nually will pay a certain amount of money into a fund for the
upkeep and improvement of sidewalks, streets, etc., in the im-
mediate area of the property concerned; (3) covenants that
liquor will not be manufactured or sold on the premises; (4)
party-wall convenants; (5) covenants to refund to property
owners; and (6) minimum line setback covenants.
But before a detailed discussion of the individual covenants
is begun, it might be beneficial to attempt to discern the role
that policy considerations have played thus far in the law of
covenants running with a fee, and what role these considera-
tions should play in the future. A statement by Mr. Justice
Holmes inferentially supports the proposition that value is to
be derived from a study of the ends and desirability of certain
specific laws:
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the
explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious
research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought
to be attained and the reasons for desiring them.42
As has been referred to earlier in this Note, the Restatement
of Property places stringent limitations on the running of the
burden in a real covenant. Granted the historical factor that such
a limitation could be found in many of the cases decided before
the Restatement was completed, still, Professor Rundell admits
that there were strong policy considerations influencing the
stated requirements. He and his advisors particularly wanted to
limit the number of running convenants, believing that the under-
lying theory - that one man should be held to the promise made
by another - makes them somewhat undesirable. They also felt
strongly about consequent adverse effects on the alienability of
land. Rundell expressly stated these objections in his reply to
Clark's first criticisms of the Restatement:
Such a rule is certainly anomalous. It also has within it the certainty
of increasing the hazards incident to the acquisition of title to land
and thus the possibility of interfering with the freedom with which
land is alienated. .. 43
I say that any rule of law which imposes a promisor's liability
on one who never made a promise is a highly anomalous one. . . 44
42 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAav. L. Rav. 457, 474 (1897).
43 Rundell, Judge Clark on the American Law Institute's Law of Real
Covenants: A Comment, 53 YAE L. J. 312, 315 (1944).
44 Id. at 325.
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That the rule stated in section 82 has its origins in considerations
of policy, I admit. That policy is that the hazard of personal liability
through succession to title to land on a promise made by someone
else ought to be, and has been, strictly limited.
4 5
Rundell's two objections constitute general policy reasons
which seem to substantiate the strict position taken by the
Restatement in respect to running covenants. Are there counter-
vailing policy factors at the same general level? Certainly there
is no public policy which labels the individual covenants un-
desirable per se; the main objection, then, seems to be that the
covenants are going to be enforced against persons other than
those who made them. It must also be considered, however, that
private ownership of land has never sanctioned complete un-
restricted use. Landowners always have had to consider the
effects on their neighbors of their activities on their own land.
4 6
Recognition of the fact that courts do not now recognize an
"untrammeled" use of land by landowners, coupled with cogni-
zance of the fact that these covenants are entered into with the
mutual assent of the contracting parties, consideration being given
for the promise and the parties expecting that the covenant will
continue to remain in force after one of them conveys his prop-
erty to another, will weaken the impact of the objection just
45 Id. at 317, n. 10. Section 82 referred to in the quotation is section 82
of the Proposed Final Draft of the Property Restatement on Servitudes. Sec-
tion 534 of the Restatement of Property is its substantial counterpart.
Rundell also admitted that policy reasons influenced the REsTATEmrEN's
rule on the running of the benefit in real covenants. He was strongly in-
fluenced by language used by Judge Beasely in National Union Bank v.
Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173, 184-85 (1877), in which case Judge Beasely said:
"But when we turn our attention to the consideration of those
covenants, which, instead of being burthensome to the land, are
beneficial to it, we perceive at once that such objection does not
apply. Such covenants do not hinder, but rather facilitate, the trans-
mission of land from hand to hand, and, therefore, with respect to
their transmissibility, the question of public convenience has no
place. This being the case, it is not easy to see why any contract,
which is of a nature to attach to the land, and which has a beneficial
tendency, should not be considered assignable, by act of law, as
against the covenantor, with the title."
In commenting on this case, Rundell said, "The reasoning of Judge
Beasely seemed convincing to me when I first read it many years ago.
It has remained convincing on each of the many times I have read it
since. It is phrased in language I can understand." Rundell, Judge Clark
on the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, supra,
at 316.
46 SHARTEL, OUR LEcAL SYSTEM AND How IT Op1EATES 457 (1951).
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noted, if properly considered by the courts.47
With this background realization that private ownership of
land does not and should not give the owner complete freedom
to use the land any way he pleases, and considering the twentieth
century trend to promote the general good,48 analysis will be
made of the individual covenants.
Property to be Used Only For Residential Purposes
In recent years, probably the most used of all of the covenants
which run with the land is the covenant which restricts use of
the property involved to residential purposes. The courts seem-
ingly have recognized the value of these covenants and have
been liberal in their consideration of them. Usually the courts
will allow these covenants to run with the sale of a fee,49 most
47 Professor Stone described the theory behind these principles thusly:
"At least three major claims really merge into the claim to have
contracts enforced.
(1) The claim that the promisor should keep his promise as such
expressed in the natural law principle that pacta sunt servanda,
sometimes called the honour principle. In a slightly modified form,
taking the premise as understood by the recipient, this yields the
cognate claim to fulfillment of reasonable expectations.
(2) The claim that where a quid pro quo is given, the receiver is
bound for his part to reciprocate in the terms on which the quid
was given, usually termed the bargain principle.
(3) The claim that where one person has to his detriment altered
his position on another's undertaking that other shall make good the
undertaking or compensate him for the detriment, usually termed
the injurious reliance principle." STONE, TBE PROVINcE AND FuNCToN
or LAw 537 (1950).
Whether or not the covenant running with the land is considered as a
contract, it still must be agreed that such a covenant arises in the first
instance only where the elements necessary for a contract are present.
Therefore, it would seem that Professor Stone's discussion is apropos.
48 See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1, 35 (1943);
SHARTEL, op. cit. supra note 49 at 453. See also CAPnozo, THE NATURE or THE
JuDIcLAL PRocEss 66-67 (1921) in which it is perspicaciously stated:
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society .... Logic and
history and custom have their place. We will shape the law to con-
form to them when we may; but only within bounds .... I do not
mean, of course, that judges are commissioned to set aside existing
rules at pleasure in favor of any other set of rules which they may
hold to be expedient or wise. I mean that when they are called upon
to say how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they
must let the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its dis-
tance."
49 Elliot v. Keely, 121 Ind. App. 529, 98 N.E.2d 374 (1951); McLaughlin
v. Neiger, 286 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. 1956); Cummins v. Colgate Properties Corp,
2 Misc. 2d 301, 153 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mer., 2 App. Div. 2d 749,
153 N.Y.S2d 608 2d Dep't 1956). But cf. Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243
N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956).
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of the time only concerning themselves with the problem of
whether or not the necessary intent that the covenant is to run
is shown by the evidence. Usually this intent will be found more
readily when the covenant is part of a general plan of residential
building rather than when a single lot is involve-d.50
The value of these covenants can readily be recognized:
through their enforcement, home owners will be encouraged to
improve their homes or build more expensive homes in the
first instance since there will be no danger of business establish-
ments moving in nearby and bringing about property deprecia-
tion. The importance of such protection has been aptly stated
as follows:
To induce the expenditure of large sums of money in erecting
residences in cities, there must be some legal machinery available
for the purpose of protecting the investment from depreciation
through the infiltration of businesses and undersirable structures
into the subdivision. .. 51
Covenants That the Property Owner Annually Will Pay a Certain
Amount of Money Into an Upkeep Fund
The leading case on this type of covenant, whereby a property
owner agrees to annually pay a specified amount of money into
a common fund, is that of Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v.
Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank,52 involving an annual land charge
payable to the property owners' association for the maintenance
of the roads, paths, parks, beaches, sewers, etc., of the neighbor-
hood. Even in the face of its own state restriction that only
negative covenants touch and concern land,53 and despite specific
recognition that the covenant involved was an affirmative
covenant to pay money, the New York court allowed the cov-
enant to run, reasoning that the covenant in substance was a
restrictive covenant and in substance did touch and concern
the land, even though outwardly it did not appear to do so.
54
It seems rather evident that one of the most important factors
in the decision, and probably the main reason for the court's
deciding the case in the way it did, was its recognition of the
utility of the covenant involved. In the opinion the court said:
"For full enjoyment in common by the defendant and other
5o Aull v. Kraft, 286 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Clark v. Guy
Drews Post of American Legion No. 88, 247 Wis. 48, 18 N.W.2d 322 (1945).
51 Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L.
REv. 951, 970 (1942).
52 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
53 See note 21 supra.
54 15 N.E.2d at 798.
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property owners of these easements or rights, the roads and
public places must be maintained."5 5 (Emphasis added.) Both the
case and the quoted statement by the court illustrate the
need for community effort in upkeep of roads and parks, beaches
and playgrounds. These are concerns which, if not handled by
the city, are peculiarly the joint interest of all of the surrounding
landowners.56 One can readily imagine the result of a plan where-
by each landowner had the duty of providing and maintaining
the streets in front of his property. 57
Covenants That Liquor Will Not be Manufactured or Sold
on the Premises
These covenants have prompted a sizable amount of litigation
in the courts and the courts have usually allowed them to run.58
This seems to be a wise policy. Not only do these covenants, ex-
cept in certain limited instances, do very little to adversely affect
the marketability of the land involved, but they prevent an ex-
tremely rapid depreciation of the value of property in the
neighborhood. Very few businesses tend to cause depreciation
of residential property value as fast as one that concerns
alcoholic beverages. Moreover, the sale of these beverages will
not be badly hurt by a strict policy of enforcement of these cov-
enants by the courts. Persons who frequent taverns do not
expect to find them in residential sections of the community;
therefore, forcing them indirectly to stay in the non-residental
areas should not harm their business. They will have the bene-
fit of regulations concerning businesses in general, and they will
be more free to conduct their inherently boisterous business
without concern about disturbing neighboring homeowners.
How strongly one landowner felt about such an establishment
can best be described by considering the covenant which he drew
up. In it he equated the noxious character of the following busi-
nesses with establishments selling or manufacturing liquor:
" . . . slaughterhouse, smithshop, forge, furnace, steam engine,
brass foundry. . . any manufactory of gun-powder, glue, varnish,
... ink or turpentine, or for the tanning, dressing or preparing
of hides, skins, or leather . . . or for carrying on any other
55 Id. at 797.
56 See SHARTEL, op. cit. supra note 46 at 463.
57 See Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 295 P.2d 714 (Wash.
1956). For a similar case with a different result, see Nassau County v.
Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
58 Condos v. Home Development Co., 77 Ariz. 129, 267 P.2d 1069 (1954);
Baker v. Seneca, 329 Mass. 736, 110 N.E.2d 325 (1953).
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noxious dangerous or offensive trade or business. ... "59 The
utility and desirability of these covenants definitely seems to
warrant their stringent enforcement.
Party-Wall Covenants
The running of the benefit or the burden of party-wall con-
tracts has seemingly been a distressing problem to courts in
general.60 When considered objectively, these covenants do not
seem as though they should be so difficult a problem. A typical
party-wall agreement runs thusly. A and B are adjoining land-
owners. A desires to build a garage on his land and he wants to
place one of its walls on the dividing line between his property
and B's property. A asks B's permission to place half of the
wall on B's side of the dividing line. B agrees and the agreement
is put in writing and recorded so that subsequent owners of
either of the lots will not think the wall to be a trespass. At the
time the agreement is made, A tells B that he may use the wall
as a wall for a building of his own, provided that he pay one-
half the cost of the wall if he uses it. After building the wall,
but before B attempts to use the wall, A sells his premises to
D, and B sells his land to C. If C then decides to build a garage
using the wall for one of the sides, why shouldn't a court enforce
the burden of the A-B covenant against him? It seems as
though both benefit and burden should run, because D paid
for the wall when he bought the land from A. A certainly
included the cost of building the wall and garage in his selling
price. Similarly, the burden should also run, for when C buys
from B, he will not be charged by B for any wall payment,
since B has made no such payments. When C uses the wall as
part of his garage, he is benefited by the wall and he should
be made to pay his share of the cost of the wall. The encumbrance
which such a covenant could be to the marketability of B's title is
practically nil, especially when it is remembered that C will
never have to pay the adjoining landowner anything if the
wall is not used. If C does use the wall, then it seems justice
would require that he pay his share of the cost of building it.
59 Kew Gardens Corp. v. Ciro's Plaza, Inc., 261 App. Div. 576, 26 N.Y.S.2d
553, 554 (2d Dep't 1941).
60 Beloit Bldg. Co. v. Quinn, 145 Kan. 507, 66 P.2d 549 (1937); 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PRoP. § 855 (3d ed. 1939); Aigler, The Running With the Land of
Agreements to Pay for a Portion of the Cost of Party-Walls, 10 MICH. L.
RPv. 187 (1912); Annot. 41 A.L.R. 1366 (1926).
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Covenant to Refund Property Owners
This is a covenant some landowners attempt to use with the
advent of new housing developments.. Illustrative of the situa-
tion is the case of Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Baltimore-Gillet
Co..?' where a person purchased a tract of land and gave the
appellants a purchase-money mortgage. Then he made a con-
tract with the city for the extension of water mains under the
streets which would be opened on the tract. He paid the city
$8,370 and made a stipulation for the allowance of credits or re-
funds as dwelling houses should be built and connecting charges
paid. He assigned his refund rights to the appellees. The appel-
lants foreclosed the mortgage and purchased at the sale, at which
time there were some accumulated refund credits. Appellants
tried to collect these refunds, saying that they ran with the land,
but the Maryland court refused to rule that they did so.
In considering this decision, one might ask whether this cove-
nant could be considered analogous to the previous party wall
covenant and thus be allowed to run with the land. The court
probably was acting in the best interests of landowners as a whole
in saying "no," for, this covenant is capable of creating more mis-
chief than the party-wall covenant. If this covenant ran with the
land and the original covenantor desired to sell before the credits
accumulated, he would certainly want to receive as much from
his -investment as he put into it. Therefore, he would have
to collect for the land and house plus the amount of money
which he paid the city. In many instances this would do much
more than merely hinder the marketability of that land - it
would practically make it unsalable. To include the amount of
the deposit in the purchase price would drive practically all
purchasers away. Most of them would not be willing to pay a
price greatly in excess of the value of the real property, even
knowing that the amount in excess of the value probably would
be returned to them, because the return of the deposit is based
on a contingency which may or may not come about. The Mary-
land court, in not allowing this agreement to run, seemingly has
balanced the interests involved and come out with a workable
result.
Minimum Line Setback Covenants
Minimum line setback covenants are found in many deeds
today. The typical setback covenant contains statements to the
effect that no buildings, fences, walls, etc., shall be placed within
61 176 Md. 594, 6 A.2d 226 (1939).
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a specified number of feet from the adjoining street. These
covenants nearly always are upheld.62 In allowing such covenants
to run, the courts rightly protect homeowners by keeping their
neighbors from building extremely close to the street and cut-
ting off the view, light, and air which are necessary incidents of
the real comfort of a home and which the buyer no doubt con-
siders when he purchases the home. These setback lines also
protect the aesthetic value of the owner's home and neighbor-
hood, providing a uniform line of homes fronting on the street.
These positive factors, along with the negative one that such
lines have become well accepted by buyers and therefore
do very little if anything to detract from the marketability of
land titles, prompt a conclusion that the courts have been wise
in allowing such covenants to run. The decision in a recent case
which reached that result shows that the courts are well aware
of the value which landowners derive from minimum line set-
back covenants:
... [It is competent for our people to protect their homes and
their access to light, air and view by covenants of restriction. The
objectives are clear. The participants wish to foster and be part of
a home area in which haphazard building, the crowding of lots and
lot lines, is prohibited. No one is required to live in such an area.
Those more gregarious, those desiring more intimate contact, have
no difficulty in finding suitable headquarters elsewhere.63 '
Methods of Releasing Restrictions Placed on Land by Running
Covenants
One of the fears which writers voice in regard to running
covenants is that they will be held enforceable by the courts
even after becoming obsolete. Concern is shown lest covenants
prevent buyers from purchasing property because of some re-
quirement outmoded by changed conditions. The covenants con-
ceivably could have this effect in a few instances; for the most
part, however, sufficient legal means exist for property owners
to rid themselves of inequitable restrictions in order that property
not be encumbered by completely outmoded burdens. The basic
rule of the release cases is that a covenant will not be enforced
if there has been a substantial change in the neighborhood which
would make enforcement of the covenants inequitable. "It is well
established that restrictive covenants against business enterprises
will not be enforced when there has been a fundamental change
in the character of the property in the restricted area due to
62 Oosterhouse v. Brummel, 343 Mich. 283, 72 N.W.2d 6 (1956).
63 Id. at 8.
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municipal expansion, spread of industry and other like causes."6
The mere fact that the removal of restrictive covenants would
enhance the value of the land involved, however, is not enough
to justify their removal. 5 A covenant will not be enforced where
the grantor acquiesces in changes made, 66 nor will one be upheld
where there has been a change in the subdivision brought about
by the grantor.67 Zoning ordinances do not eliminate or super-
sede these covenants, but an ordinance can be used to show
evidence of changed conditions.68 An important aspect of re-
lease considerations is the fact that a landowner whose land is
subject to a running covenant need not violate that covenant
in order to test it. In most instances an action for a declaratory
judgment is allowed. 9
Thus, the fear that running covenants will place highly in-
equitable burdens on a landowner is largely unfounded. The legal
process has provided remedies for the unduly burdened land-
owner; he will be released where such release is shown neces-
sary by standards of fairness to both the restricted landowner
and his neighbors.
Conclusion
Policy considerations should enter into the determination of
the question of whether or not a covenant is going to be allowed
to run with the sale of a fee. When these considerations are
recognized, statements to the effect that all covenants should be
strictly construed in order to promote the alienability of land
contain an inherent contradiction, for some running covenants
not only do not hinder the marketability of the land, but
rather increase the value and desirability of the land involved.
Moreover, the fear of these covenants placing inequitable
burdens on land is ill-founded. It seems, then, that a more liberal
attitude by the courts toward running covenants is warranted.
Whether or not the courts should continue to use the four
tests is a more difficult question. Probably the Restatement's
privity of estate provision should not be followed. If the
privity of estate requirement is retained at all, it should be
64 Anness v. Freeman, 294 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ky. 1956).
65 Parrish v. Newbury, 279 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1956).
66 Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956).
67 Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 111. 619, 61 N.E.2d 552 (1945).
68 Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956).
69 Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); Parrish
v. Newbury, 279 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1955).
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construed in such liberal fashion as will find the requirement
satisfied by mere succession to some interest of the covenanting
parties. The touch and concern test probably cannot be done
away with; however, it should be considered fulfilled if the
covenant concerns either a pecuniary advantage to the land or
a physical touching. The intent requirement, of course, must
remain, and should be held satisfied if intent that the covenant
run is shown from all the circumstances surrounding its signing.
The covenant should be in writing, and this requirement should
be necessary whether the covenant is considered to be an interest
in land or not, for a written promise will allow the successor to
know more definitely his rights and obligations.
Probably these tests will not be satisfactory to all. That is not
important. What is important is that some conclusion is reached
as to the tests to determine the validity of these covenants
after thoughtful consideration of the problem in the light of
present day needs. For, as Mr. Justice Holmes so aptly warned:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished




70 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rsv. 457, 469 (1897).
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